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RACE IN ORDINARY COURSE: UTILIZING
THE RACIAL BACKGROUND IN ANTITRUST
AND CORPORATE LAW COURSES
ALFRED DENNIS MATHEWSON*
This article is about the discourse in law school classes in
which non-white students are in classes with white students.1 I
recall the integration of race in one of my first year law classes. I
was one of a handful of Black students in Professor Geoffrey
Hazard's Civil Procedure class at Yale Law School. Professor
Hazard had supplemented the casebook with materials that he
had prepared for a case as an attorney. I do not recall the exact
details, but I believe the case was Swann v. Burkett.2 This case
involved an African-American couple that sued a landlord under
the Unruh Civil Rights Act 3 for refusing to rent them an
apartment because of their race. Professor Hazard had chosen
the case because it was a personal triumph as he had
successfully represented the plaintiffs. Although Professor
Hazard used it to demonstrate procedural rules, he brought race
out of the background. While race was not relevant to the Civil
Procedure rules, it was germane to the substantive cause of
action in the case.
My colleague, Margaret Montoya, published an account4 of her
* ©2007. Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. I presented the framework for
this paper at the AALS Workshop on Racial Justice in a New Millennium: From Brown to
Grutter-Methods to Achieve Nondiscrimination and Comparable Racial Equality in
Portland, Oregon, June 2004. I wish to thank Taunya Banks, Norman Bay, Eric Gerding,
and Antoinette Sedillo Lopez for their helpful comments.
1 Race does not tend to create the same degree of controversy in classrooms with
mixed nonwhite students.
2 26 Cal.Rptr. 286 (Ct. App. 1962).
3 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 2008).
4 Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grednas: Un/Masking The Self While
Un/Braiding Latina Stories And Legal Discourse, 15 CHICAGO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 18
(1994).
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encounter with Josefina Chavez, in the discussion of People v.
Chavez, 5as a first year law student in Criminal Law class. She
recounted that the case involved Ms. Chavez's conviction for
manslaughter in the death of her newborn baby. The legal issue
was whether the child had been born alive, and the class
discussion had been limited to the facts relevant to that question.
Professor Montoya recalled her surprise at the lack of
examination of other facts such as "her youth, her poverty, her
fear over the pregnancy, her delivery in silence".6 For two days,
these other facts - as well as her race or ethnicity7 - had been
confined to the factual background for whatever use individual
students might make of them, until Professor Montoya, then a
student, interjected with an inquiry. Such facts were deemed
irrelevant to the legal doctrines and thus not emphasized in
teaching students to notice only the relevant facts for legal
analysis.
In first year classes designed to teach students traditional legal
analysis or to think like a lawyer, like Criminal Law, the concept
of relevancy is the primary device used to determine which
images will be sharpened for the application of legal rules and
which will remain out of focus in the background. This
framework normally relegates race into the background abyss in
law school courses except those addressing civil rights,
employment discrimination, or racial justice. The relevancy
paradigm is in fact taught in classes in all three years of law
school.
In 1986, Derrick Bell assaulted this pedagogical paradigm
when he taught a section of the Constitutional Law course at
Stanford University. The reaction of students and the faculty to
his approach emphasizing the role of race in the development of
American Constitutional jurisprudence transformed his
experience into one of the watershed events in the history of
critical race legal theory.8 Unlike the other Stanford professors,
he saw race as a highly relevant fact in the subject matter of the
5 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
6 Montoya, supra note 4, at 18.
7 The year was 1945 and Josefina Chavez is a Spanish name, but her race is not
mentioned in the opinion. See Chavez, 176 P.2d at 92-93.
8 See Tom Philip, Law Dean Apologizes to Black Prof, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov.




course. Even though Professor Bell had not really deviated from
the normative relevancy paradigm, Stanford Law School
students then, like students in most law schools today, seemed to
prefer the old pedagogical order in which the discussion or
analysis of racial issues was segregated in courses explicitly
pertaining to race, such as Race and the Law, Employment
Discrimination, and Civil Rights Law. 9 A traditional course
simply was not the proper place. The Stanford Law School
administration apparently agreed with the students as the Dean
arranged for a series of lectures to supplement or enhance
Professor Bell's course. 10
Professor Bell did not call his course Race and Constitutional
Law even though he had authored a casebook 1 on the subject
used in a number of courses bearing that or some similar name
in law schools and undergraduate programs. I do not believe
that Professor Bell thought he was teaching such a course, nor do
I believe that he intended to do so. He was teaching a course in
Constitutional Law and approached it just like any other
professor using a particular point of view. His emphasis of race
was no different from some professor using Law and Economics
to analyze judicial decisions and legal rules. In the ensuing
decade, numerous law teachers of color sought to emulate
Professor Bell in the classroom as well as in scholarship. 12 The
result has been the development of Critical Race Theory as a
9 See McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 112 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied
en banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14554 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to recognize common law
action for racial discrimination). See also Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance and
Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial
Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 222-24 (1993)
(noting Judge Posner's refusal to recognize common law right to be free from racial
discrimination); Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1048
(2003) (indicating conservative model of law and economics is embedded in legal
community).
10 See Philip, supra note 8 (highlighting the Dean's decision to set up alternative
lectures in response to student reaction to a visiting professor).
11 DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (Little Brown & Co. 1981).
12 These include Paul Butler, Roy Brooks, Dorothy Brown, Sumi Cho, Kimberle
Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Margaret Montoya.
For a bibliography of materials on the use of race in the classroom and sample syllabi on
courses on race and the law, critical race theory, civil rights, and other courses
incorporating race see University of Florida Levin College of Law, Center for the Study of
Race and Race Relations: Race and Law Curriculum Workshop, Inaugural Conference
[hereinafter Conference]: February 24-26, 2005, available at http://www.law.ufl.edu/
centers/csrrr/conference050224.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
20081
STJOItN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:3
mainstream field of study in legal education. 3  It has
overshadowed its forebear Critical Legal Studies and become as
important to jurisprudential inquiry as Law and Economics. 14 Its
success, however, has obscured the discussion in legal discourse
of virtually any aspect of the African-American experience other
than discrimination or its remediation. If the legal issue does not
explicitly concern discrimination, neither the identity of persons
involved as African Americans nor their experiences is relevant
to the discussion.
15
In Critical Race Theory, race drives the analysis of legal
issues.16 Race is examined in the context of racial minorities in
juxtaposition with a white majority. 17 In fact, the subordination
of racial minorities by a dominant white majority rather than
race itself is central to the analyses. For example, Beverly Moran
explores this thesis in her seminal work examining the structural
discrimination of the tax code against Blacks.' 8 Her approach has
been followed by numerous scholars and has most recently been
13 See DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS (West Law School 2003) (discussing the method of examining cases through
the analytical framework of Critical Race Theory, other books, and data on schools
offering this method).
14 See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END 167-85 (NYU Press 1996) (describing the history and development of
Critical Race Theory).
15 The classroom was not the beginning of Professor Bell's assault on the elimination
of the African American experience in legal analysis through the concept of relevancy. He
first addressed it with his incorporation of narratives in analyzing equal protection
jurisprudence in a recent law review article. Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985). Alex M. Johnson defends the use of narratives by writing that
"[n]o longer are issues addressed from a neutral perspective in which facts, theories,
heuristics, and paradigms are studied. Instead, insight on legal issues is explicated from
experiences. Insight is gleaned through doing rather than through thinking." Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color:
Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 851
(1994). However, Daniel Farber and Suzanne Sherry believe that there is no "reason to
abandon the expectation that legal scholarship contain reason and analysis, as well as
narrative. A legal story without analysis is much like a judicial opinion with 'Findings of
Fact' but no 'Conclusions of Law."' Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 854 (1993).
16 See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 95 (1994) (describing Critical Race
Theory's analysis as being grounded "on the real, everyday experiences of people of color").
17 See id. at 112 (stating "CRT challenges us to envision a more democratic system of
civil litigation, in which the socially weaker party has a real opportunity to confront the
socially powerful party.").
18 Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 751 (1996). Professor Moran explores the impact of the policies
underlying Internal Revenue Code preferential treatment of property relative to wages on
the wealth differential between Blacks and Whites. Id.
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applied to the corporate and securities law fields. 19 Even
Whiteness Studies pursue this approach.20 Critical race theory
approaches to traditional legal subject matters also emphasize
this juxtaposition. 21
In contrast, I incorporate race into my courses in antitrust and
corporate law but I do not use critical race theory pedagogy. I
use an ordinary course approach 22 in which I treat race as a
factual and pedagogical norm in legal discourse when it may
enhance my teaching of the subject. I may use race even when it
is not relevant to a specific legal rule because it may be relevant
for background information or the explanation of inferences and
reasoning. While I stake a position distinct from critical race
theorists, I do not analyze critical race theory or the large body of
scholarship pertaining thereto in this article. I limit my
discussion to my use of race in teaching traditional law school
subjects, specifically antitrust and corporate law. I present this
article in two parts. In Part I, I describe the challenges of using
critical race theory to introduce discussions of race in traditional
law school subjects. Race is interjected as an outsider. In Part
II, I present my race in ordinary course approach. I do not
suggest that my approach is superior to Critical Race Theory; I
offer it only as another avenue of discussing race. In my
approach, the subject matter drives the analysis and race is
visibly interwoven into conventional legal analysis.
I. CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN THE CLASSROOM
Teachers utilizing the critical race approach often find that
students struggle with making a choice of focusing on the study
of race or on the traditional subject matter. The reactions of the
19 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20 See Darryl Fears, Hue and Cry on 'Whiteness Studies; An Academic Fields Take on
Race Stirs Interest and Anger, THE WASH. POST, June 20, 2003, at A01. "'Historically, it
has been common to see whites as a people who don't have a race, to see racial identity as
something others have ... [i]t's a great advance to start looking at whiteness as a group."
Id.
21 See Conference, supra note 12.
22 The approach is derived from the "ordinary course of business" concept in the
Uniform Commercial Code. See e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(9), 7-205, 9-320 (buyer in ordinary
course); §9-321 (licensee in ordinary course) (2008). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004) equates the term to "course of business" and defines it as "the normal routine in
managing a trade or business." The normal routine as opposed to an uncommon event is
the essence of my race in ordinary course approach.
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Stanford students demonstrate the difficulty of using the critical
race approach.23 At least three legal symposiums have addressed
the incorporation of issues of race into law school courses. In
2004, the American Association of Law Schools presented its
Workshop on Racial Justice at its midyear meeting.24 In 2005, St.
John's University School of Law presented a symposium on the
incorporation of racial issues in corporate law subjects.25 In the
spring of 2006, the Center for the Study of Race and Race
Relations at the University of Florida Levin College of Law held
a Race and Law Curriculum Workshop.26  Each of these
symposiums included discussions of pedagogical approaches of
law professors and the challenges presented by those approaches.
Nearly all of the professors who deliberately incorporate race into
subjects not directly related to racial justice report the similar
reactions to those that greeted Professor Bell.
The greatest challenge is that discussions of race tend to
distract students from straight-forward analyses of legal subject
matter, and the magnitude of the distraction is difficult to
control. In fact, the degree of distraction appears to be inversely
related to the perceived degree of relevance to the subject matter.
This distraction phenomenon occurs for several reasons. First,
many hypotheticals involve settings in which the default race is
white and, while noticed by all, it need not be spoken.28 Colors
other than white must be tagged or marked in the discussion in
order for them to be visible. When they are, unless the
subordination/dominance axis is directly in issue, race tends to
23 See generally Benjamin Blaisdell, Seeing Every Student as a 10: Using Critical
Race Theory to Engage White Teachers' Colorblindness, INT'L J. EDUC. POL'Y, RES. &
PRAC., Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-
9713608_ITM.
24 See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Justice in the New Millennium; From Brown
to Grutter: Methods to Achieve Non-Discrimination and Comparable Racial Equality, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 243 (2004); see also Symposium, Racial and Legal Education, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2004). An earlier version of this article was presented at that
symposium.
25 See Symposium, The Intersection of Race, Corporate Law, and Economic
Development, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 701 (2003).
26 See Conference, supra note 12.
27 See Angela Mae Kupenda, Moving from Fear to Courage, and Replacing Preaching
with Reaching, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.law.ufl.edu/centers/csrrr/pdf/racelawconf/
kupenda.pdf; see also Cynthia Lee, Integrating Race into the Curriculum: Learning from
Failure, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.law.ufledu/centers/csrrr/pdf/racelawconf/lee.PDF.
28 Race is usually in the background even when it is obvious and not white. One
writer noted that race is always present. See Kupenda, supra note 27, at 2-5.
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take on significance in the discussion that is disproportionate to
its actual importance. It comes with a presumption that the
subordination/dominance axis is in play. It invites intense
emotional reactions that overwhelm dispassionate rational
analyses. Thus, the raising of race in a traditional doctrinal
course will frequently appear as an oddity to the majority of
students. The powerful allure of the subordination/dominance
axis overwhelms the analytical relevance of race to the subject
matter. 29 The initial and perhaps final inference that students
draw about its presence is that the professor is raising the
subordination/dominance axis. The search for some other
relevancy is not undertaken, and the student is closed to any
attempt to show such relevance. This problem is particularly
acute in business law courses where students may see race as
wholly irrelevant. Many students simply do not envision race in
the picture of commercial transactions in part because they do
not readily contemplate the subordination/dominance theme in
transactions routinely described in the Wall Street Journal or the
business section of local newspapers. Since race is not germane
to the substantive issues, the forced discussion of the
subordination/dominance axis serves no meaningful purpose
other than to teach students political correctness.
Second, students may be uncomfortable with a discussion
focusing on race because the dynamics of extemporaneous
classroom discussion will inevitably lead to a script in which any
discussion of race - no matter how well intentioned - will result in
a student making a remark that is racially insensitive or viewed
as racially insensitive. The conversation is a delicate one as
heightened sensibilities scrutinize language for overt and coded
racism. That student will then be subjected to class or school
wide reprobation as a racist, and students serving up the
reprobation will be greeted with derision as overly sensitive or
politically correct. The ensuing conversation will disrupt the
classroom discussion with one concentrated on racism rather
than the substantive legal principles of the course. Reasoned
analysis appears to exit the discourse.3
°
29 A similar idea is contained in FED. R. EVID. 403. which provides that "[a]lthough
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ......
30 I say "appears to exit" because students presume that other students are speaking
2008]
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The controversy over Andrew Young's remarks in the Los
Angeles Sentinel during the summer of 2006 is a case in point.
31
Reverend Young had been consulting with Wal-Mart on its
overseas labor practices and had been a strong defender of the
company. His basic position is that large corporations have a
positive role to play in eliminating world wide poverty.
32
Reverend Young resigned over the following remarks printed in
the Los Angeles Sentinel in defense of Wal-Mart:
"Well, I think they should; they ran the 'mom and pop' stores
out of my neighborhood," the paper quoted Young as saying.
"But you see, those are the people who have been
overcharging us selling us stale bread and bad meat and
wilted vegetables. And they sold out and moved to Florida. I
think they've ripped off our communities enough. First it was
Jews, then it was Koreans and now it's Arabs; very few black
people own these stores. 33
Although he has apologized for his statement and resigned as a
consultant of Wal-Mart, he still continues to defend his answer:
"Things that are matter-of-fact in Atlanta, in the New
York and Los Angeles environment, tend to be a lot more
volatile ...
He intended his comments to be in ordinary course. 35 He resigned
from predisposed positions.
31 See Wal-Mart Imagemaker Quits Amid PR Flap, CBS NEwS, Aug. 18, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/O8/18/business/main1909213.shtml (discussing
Andrew Young's decision to step down from his position as head of an outside support
group hired by Wal-Mart to improve its image after making statements that were seen as
racist and offensive).
32 See Andrew Young Resigns from Wal-Mart Group, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14406528 (noting Young's opinion that not enough
attention has been paid to the positive effects large business and corporations can have on
the international community in helping to solve the problems of the poor).
33 Id. In apologizing for his remarks, Young went on to say "[t]hings that are matter-
of-fact in Atlanta, in the New York and Los Angeles environment, tend to be a lot more
volatile." Id. His comments, thus, were in ordinary course.
34 Id.
35 In fact, in his March 2, 2006 interview on NPR, where Young defends his
acceptance of the position with Wal-Mart, he spoke of the overcharging by Mom and Pop
businesses in black communities that were not owned by Blacks. See Andrew Young, In
Defense of Wal-Mart (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5241430. He did not say more about the race or
ethnicities of the business owners. Id. See also John Hope Bryant, Ambassador Andrew
Young and the Los Angeles Sentinel Interview: A Perspective from Someone in the Room,
OURWEEKLY.coM, Aug. 25, 2006, http://www.johnhopebryant.co/johnhope-bryant-/
2006/08/ambassador_andr_2.html. Mr. Bryant explains that he was present during
Andrew Young's interview with the Los Angeles Sentinel where the allegedly racist
[Vol. 23:3
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because the ensuing reaction not only distracted from his
campaign to promote good corporate citizenship with Wal-Mart,
but completely disrupted it.3 6 It would be impossible for him to
discuss Wal-Mart without also having to deal with the
reprobation that he receives from the remarks.37
Students of color may be uncomfortable invoking race because
they fear that the mere mentioning of race will obscure the
substantive point they are making. Moreover, they may not wish
to assume responsibility in the classroom for espousing the
viewpoint of their racial group or be listened to only when they
do.
II. RACE IN ORDINARY COURSE
Notwithstanding the minefield encountered by critical race
theorists in traditional subjects, I regularly elevate the role of
race in courses I teach, including Antitrust Law and Business
Associations. Specifically, I call attention to the presence of non-
whites in the factual background. While I am more likely to
bring African Americans into focus, I look for settings that
involve Native Americans, Latinos and other racial minorities. If
the setting is a racially integrated one, I draw that out as well.
In elevating race, I have sought to follow Professor Bell's original
approach but, in contrast to critical race theorists who attempt to
raise issues of racial oppression and subordination in traditional
courses, I direct attention to race in the ordinary course of class
discussion. In my view, race is a material factor in the legal
issues regardless of whether it is directly relevant in the
application of substantive legal rules. Nevertheless, I continually
illuminate its connection to the class subject matter.
I do not necessarily make race visible in these courses to invite
discussions of subordination/dominance axis. In my view, race is
remarks arose, and he believes that they were taken out of context and did not reflect
Andrew Young's actual beliefs. Id.
36 See Andrew Young Steps Down From Wal-Mart After Comments Deemed Offensive,
Associated PRESS, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,209
144,00.html (noting that Young's comments sparked controversy over the purpose of his
outside support group aimed at helping Wal-Mart's public interest as it appeared to
attack Wal-Mart's critics).
37 See Wal-Mart Imagemaker Quits Amid PR Flap, supra note 31. "I [Young] think I
was on the verge of becoming part of the controversy, and I didn't want to become a
distraction from the main issues, so I thought I ought to step down." Id.
2008]
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an ordinary part of life and society and therefore is appropriate
for discussion as economic implications. Although invoking race
normally means concentrating on the stories of historical racial
minorities,3 8 using race in the ordinary course of business law
courses means examining cases or problems in which race is a
factor that may be relevant to the analysis of the subject matter
and therefore may be examined like any other in the factual
context in which those legal issues arise.
I embrace race for several reasons. First, it is visible in many
of the contexts in which I envision the operation of substantive
rules. I am familiar with the setting and use it in ways similar to
the use of metaphors.39 Second, I heighten the visibility of race
because I want to change the script for discourse when the
subject of race comes up in classrooms and other settings. I want
a conversation to take place with the same breadth and depth of
jazz; one that includes the fundamental criticism of critical race
theory as well as Smooth Jazz. n° Third, I seek to eradicate the
assumption that someone who speaks about race necessarily
takes a position of preconditioned passion and emotion rather
than reason. 4' Thus, it is necessary to use a framework that is
vastly rich in experience, but not chained to the blues of the
subordination/dominance axis. 42 By invoking race, I may make
38 See David Dante Troutt, Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark,
Speech at the Race and Law Curriculum Workshop, University of Florida Levin College of
Law (Feb. 2005) (transcript available at http://www.law.ufl.edu/centers/csrrr/pdf/racelaw
confltroutt.pdt) (noting that a professor uses hypothetical questions involving ongoing
problems of a black-owned business in Business Torts & Intellectual Property classes); see
also Kupenda, supra note 27, at 3 (arguing that discussion of the protection of minority
shareholders naturally invites a comparison of the political treatment of racial
minorities).
39 See James R. Elkins, Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 117, 133-35 (2000) (describing the use of metaphors to explain rules
in legal analysis).
40 "Smooth Jazz" is "generally described as a genre of music that utilizes instruments
(and, at times, improvisation) traditionally associated with jazz and stylistic influences
drawn from mostly R&B, but also funk and pop." Wikipedia.com, Smooth Jazz,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smoothjazz#Description (last modified Nov. 6, 2008).
41 Cf. Rachel F. Moran, Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century: Diversity and
its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 2334-35
(2000) (stating "[elven when faculty attempt to use philosophical abstractions to contain
heated discussions about race and gender, emotions break through and influence the
discussion ... [this] may have reinforced professors' anxieties that these discussions
inevitably will 'cross the borders of legitimate, respectful, professional discourse' and 'lead
to tension, hard feelings, and censorship"').
42 Professor Calmore uses the metaphor of white acceptance of jazz to explain critical
race theory in the classroom. See generally John 0. Calmore, Article: Critical Race Theory,
Archie Shepp, And Fire Music: Securing An Authentic Intellectual Life In A Multicultural
[Vol. 23:3
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some white students uncomfortable and perhaps some non-white
students. I do not avoid the subordination/dominance axis or use
race in some other way, however, to address student comfort
levels. I use race in a way that I hope facilitates a discourse that
recognizes the presence of reason.
Finally, I have a grander purpose for enhancing the presence of
race in the classroom. There is a presumption underlying Anglo-
American jurisprudence that traditional legal rules are race-
neutral and have universal application to the relevant facts.43 I
introduce race to test this proposition in a couple of ways. First,
to see whether ostensibly neutral legal rules lead to results
consistent with the underlying policies and objectives when
applied to different racial contexts. Secondly, to see whether
there would be "Hurricane Katrina" type effects where the
application of race neutral storm evacuation polices failed with
disastrous consequences.44  This approach will be further
explained in describing my race in the ordinary course approach
to the classroom.
There is a by-product in which I am also interested. I want
students to see and discuss issues involving African Americans in
situations other than as criminals or victims in the
subordination/dominance axis.45 By having more discussions
World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2147 (1992) (asserting "[airt is a direct cultural
manifestation that synthesizes and refines a life-style and world view. Critical race
theory's scholarship ... creates an art style that represents a fulfillment of culture. Not
content to imitate white or dominant scholarship's canons, methods, and analyses, people
of color are adding our own distinctly stylized dimensions to legal scholarship.").
43 See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship
and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991); see also
Reginald Leamon Robinson, Lead Article: Race, Myth and Narrative in the Social
Construction of the Black Self, 40 HOW. L.J. 1 (1996).
44 The policymakers did not appreciate the circumstances confronting the residents of
the Ninth Ward or how those residents would assess those circumstances. The policy
makers did not understand the information flows or the assessment of available
information within the Ninth Ward.
45 See George H. White, Defense of the Negro Race-Charges Answered, Jan. 29, 1901,
available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/whitegh/whitegh.html. Representative White
speaks of the proclivity to define African Americans by the worst rather than our best:
I want to enter a plea for the colored man, the colored woman, the colored boy, and
the colored girl of this country. I would not thus digress from the question at issue
and detain the House in a discussion of the interests of this particular people at this
time but for the constant and the persistent efforts of certain gentlemen upon this
floor to mold and rivet public sentiment against us as a people and to lose no
opportunity to hold up the unfortunate few who commit crimes and depredations and
lead lives of infamy and shame, as other races do, as fair specimens of representatives
of the entire colored race.
Id. at 4.
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about African Americans in transactional contexts, I hope to
create scripts for conversations about race across and within
diverse racial groups that include positive images of African
Americans.
There are three basic circumstances in which I heighten the
visibility of race: when the presence of nonwhites is a notable
element of the transactional context, when a dispute occurs in a
community that may be characterized by its color, and when an
issue along the racial subordination/dominance axis occurs in a
business setting thus lending itself to a doctrinal analysis under
business associations law. The first two of these ways may, but
need not, concern an issue of racial subordination.
A. Race as a Notable Element of the Factual Context
The example of race as a notable element occurs when a person
of color is or may be involved in the dispute in some capacity,
such as a party, lawyer, judge or witness. In Business
Associations, for example, Marcus Garvey's conviction for
securities fraud provides an opportunity to examine issues in the
mechanics of corporate formation as well as provide a setting
examining securities fraud. 6 Garvey is identifiable as an African
American.
The Black Star Line and other entities involve African
Americans and communities that are identifiable as such. The
history lesson on the subordination/dominance axis and economic
empowerment serves as the hook to engage students in the
analysis of the securities framework while simultaneously
demonstrating corporate and commercial transactions occurring
within African-American communities.
While some students may desire to discuss the racial politics, it
is unlikely that they are aware of the substantive legal issues.
As a result, many students find the opportunity to examine them
fascinating. Garvey appealed his conviction for mail fraud in
46 See Jeffery M. Brown, Article, Black Internationalism: Embracing an Economic
Paradigm, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 807 (2002). "Garvey remains perhaps best known for
advocating a radical but largely ill-conceived plan to create a Pan-African commercial
trade and manufacturing network that would empower people of color ... [Tihe BSL
[Black Star Line shipping company] sold shares of common stock to its investors,
idealistic African-Americans who believed and invested in Garvey's vision... " Id. at 843.
However, this plan came under attack by the New York District Attorney who "accused
Garvey and his BSL of engaging in fraudulent investment practices." Id. at 843-44.
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connection with the sale of stock in the Black Star Line, Inc., one
of several organizations - most of which were nonprofits - that he
founded. "7 Garvey raised millions of dollars between 1919 and
1921, but the money was not managed well and very little of the
money could be accounted for. 48  Prominent leaders in the
African-American community including members of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, publicly
denounced Garvey and urged the Department of Justice to
prosecute him presumably for preying on the hopes and dreams
of numerous uneducated poor and working class folks. 49 Garvey
was charged with mail fraud for sending a circular or letter to
Benny Dancy offering shares of stock in Black Star Line, Inc., a
Delaware corporation formed specifically for the purpose of
operating a steamship line to transport blacks to Africa.5 °
Garvey's defense was rooted in the subordination/dominance
axis. He acknowledged the mailings from several
organizations, 51 but maintained that those who paid money were
not purchasing stock but were "more intent on the ultimate
uplifting and salvation ... promised to the negro race of America
than to the paltry profits that might be realized from the stock
47 See Garvey v. U.S., 4 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1925). Garvey allegedly took part in
"exhortations to buy worthless stock, accompanied by deceivingly false statements as to
the worth thereof, he was guilty of a scheme or artifice to defraud ... if such scheme...
was accompanied by the use of the mails defined by the statute, he was guilty of an
offense." Id. at 975.
48 See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Commercial and Corporate Lawyers 'N the Hood, 21
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 769, 778 n.7 (1999) (explaining that Black Star Line actually
existed, but was poorly managed and even sold stock at Garvey's speaking engagements
by sending around offering plates in which people placed their money in order to purchase
shares).
49 See Wants Garvey Tried Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1922, at 10 (reporting that
Chandler Owen, African-American newspaper editor, announced during Friends of Negro
Freedom meeting that group would urge Department of Justice to prosecute Garvey); see
also 2000 Negroes Hear Garvey Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1922, at 7 (quoting Dr.
Robert W. Bagnall, organizer for National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, from speech given at another Friends of Negro Freedom meeting saying that
Garvey, "has misled poor, ignorant negroes... promising them a competence for life from
their investments in this enterprises"); 'Garvey Must Go,' Negroes Declare, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1922, at 19 ('Marcus Garvey Must Go' was the slogan at three meetings of
negroes held in Harlem yesterday by men and women who expressed dissatisfaction with
Garvey's handling of the affairs of the Universal Negro Improvement Association.").
50 See Garvey, 4 F.2d at 975. The prosecutor told the jury at the trial that thirty to
forty thousands blacks had purchased approximate $1,000,000 of Black Star Line stock.
Marcus Garvey on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1923, at 16.
51 Other non-profit organizations which Garvey claimed were included in the Black
Star Line, Inc. enterprise included the Universal Negro Improvement Association, the
Liberian Construction Loan, the African Legion, the Black Cross Nurses, and the Negro
Factories Corporation. See Mathewson, supra note 48, at 773.
20081
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
investment. 52
In Business Associations, class discussions about the Garvey
case may revolve around the distinction between nonprofit and
for-profit enterprises, the issuance of shares of stock, or record
ownership. In Securities Regulations, the discussion may center
on the technical requirements of the mail fraud statute in
comparison with the Federal Securities Act of 193353 and Section
10b-5 of the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 5' A
deeper conversation involves underlying policies for protecting
unsecured investors as the primary contributors to Garvey's
enterprises who were for working poor with relatively little
education, an issue that may come up from time to time in the
course.
Garvey is also interesting for another reason. It is difficult to
believe that the Black Star Line was a significant blip on the
radar screen of the Justice Department.55 Garvey was raising
substantial amounts of money through a variety of methods, but
the Justice Department was only concerned about the sales of
capital stock.56 The concentration on the mail fraud statutes to
attack the stock sales reflects the Katrina Effect suggested
above.57 Examination of it leads to a second line of inquiry
regarding the impact of the regulatory scheme on capital
formation within African American and other communities of
color. Does the regulatory scheme facilitate the flow of capital
out of those communities? Students are asked about the
transactions costs associated with compliance, access of Garvey
52 Garvey, 4 F.2d at 975.
53 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933).
54 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1934).
55 The court noted that racial uplift appears to have been at the core of Garvey's
activities and the sales of stock were only a part, and perhaps, of lesser significance in the
overall scheme.
It may be true that Garvey fancied himself a Moses, if not a Messiah; that he
deemed himself a man with a message to deliver, and believed that he needed ships
for the deliverance of his people; but with this assumed, it remains true that if his
gospel consisted in part of exhortations to buy worthless stock, accompanied by
deceivingly false statements as to the worth thereof, he was guilty of a scheme or
artifice to defraud.
Garvey, 4 F.2d at 975.
56 Id.
57 The indictment charged Garvey and associates with a scheme "to persuade negroes
for the most part to buy shares of stock in the Black Star Line at $5 per share, when the
defendants well knew, notwithstanding florid representations to the contrary, that said
shares were not and in all human probability never could be worth $5 each or any other
sum of money." Id. at 974.
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to securities professionals. Students are free to continue the
discourse along the more traditional
subordination/discrimination axis but some of that conversation
will now include fine points of securities law.
I use the discussion specifically to question whether the
regulatory scheme ostensibly designed to protect unsophisticated
investors has an unintended Katrina effect in communities of
color. Garvey raised money from stock sales and charitable
contributions; 58 yet he was prosecuted for only the stock sales.
5 9
The securities laws do not regulate the raising of money for
charities or churches. 60 Thus, the regulatory scheme imposes
substantial transaction costs on raising commercial capital in
African-American communities. 61  The rise of Prosperity
Theology 62 is in part due to the absence of similar transactional
costs in charitable fundraising and religious fundraising. I also
examine other collateral implications of this asymmetrical
regulatory scheme. It suggests that the protection of
unsophisticated investors is for the protection of the securities
markets more so than the investors. Unsophisticated investors
58 See Ben F. Rogers, William E. B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey, and Pan-Africa, 40 J.
NEGRO HIST. 154, 161 (1955).
Of course, it would cost a great deal of money to finance any Back-to-Africa
movement, but this was the least of Garvey's difficulties, for he was a fund raiser
without peer. ... He sold tickets to most of his speeches, pictures of himself for
50 [cents] apiece, and Christmas cards bearing his likeness for 50 [cents] a dozen.
The greatest of all his fund-raising drives, however, was the promotion of the
Black Star Line, a steamship company whose boats would be owned and manned
by Negroes and would eventually be the means of transporting American
Negroes to Africa at the time of the great migration.
Id.
59 See Garvey, 4 F.2d at 975-76 (detailing Garvey's fraud scheme).
60 See Fed. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(4), which provides an exemption for certain
non-profit organizations as follows:
Any security issued by a person organized and operated exclusively for
religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory
purposes and not for pecuniary profit, and no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any person, private stockholder, or individual; or any
security of a fund that is excluded from the definition of an investment
company under section 3(c)(10)(B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Id.
61 See Garvey, 4 F.2d at 975 (discussing incidental costs of running this type of
scheme).
62 See John Blake, Was Jesus Rich? Swanky Messiah Not Far-Fetched in Prosperity
Gospel, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 22, 2006, at 1 (stating "the basic tenet is God rewards
the faithful with wealth, spiritual power and debt-free living."); see also John Blake,
Cashing In On the Faithful; Some Pastors Adopt Strong-Arm Tactics to Shame
Parishioners Into Shelling Out, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 27, 2002, at 1B (declaring that
"[g]iving becomes a means to prosperity... [iut's giving to get.").
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are unpredictable and consequently may render the market
unstable. 3 It seems that they are free to lose their wealth in
charitable donations as long as they do not disrupt the capital
markets. The result is that the residents of disadvantaged
communities or members of disadvantaged racial groups are
limited in the ways they can invest in their own communities.
There is a tendency in corporate and commercial law classes to
assume that the cases and transactions studied involve white
principals in largely white community settings. Consider the
agency case Cargill64 that I teach in Business Associations. The
setting is Iowa farm country. Cargill financed the owners of the
local grain elevator in Warren, Minnesota.65 This is another
agency law case and the question is whether Cargill exercised so
much control over the owner that he was its agent.66 I suspect
that the owners of the elevator, the farmers who sold them grain,
and the executives at Cargill were white, but I have never
wondered whether their color may be relevant to the discussion
of agency law. Because Garvey is a securities law case involving
an African-American principal in an African-American
community setting, it is used in Business Associations.
Garvey is an example where the racial identity of a party is
conspicuous and his race is a material factor in the doctrinal
analysis. Billops v. Magness Construction, 6 7 - a case that
previously was included in editions of KLEIN, RAMSEYER AND
BAINBRIDGE'S Business Association case book 68 - involves a case
where race is less obvious, is not alluded to in the opinion but
perhaps explains the results. In that case, a group organized a
fashion show at a Hilton Hotel in Delaware. 69 The event included
an art exhibit and dance. 70 The group noisily objected to the
hotel's insistence that they pay for everything in advance on the
63 See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 1989).
64 A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
65 Id. at 288 (detailing Cargill's agreement).
66 Id. at 290 (stating the "major issue" in the case).
67 391 A.2d 196 (Del. 1978).
68 The case was deleted from WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS,
AND CORPORATIONS (6th ed. 2006) and replaced with Miller v. McDonald's Corp., 945 P.2d
1107 (1997). KLEIN, RAMSEYER & BAINBRIDGE at 58. The authors explain that Miller
"offers better facts and a clearer explanation of the law." Id. at xii.
69 Billops, 391 A.2d. at 197 (describing the events that lead to the lawsuit).
70 Id. at 197 (expounding on details of the events that resulted in the suit).
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evening of the event. 7' The state police were called.7 2 The
plaintiffs sued the hotel and the Hilton chain. The issue in the
case is one of agency law, whether Hilton Corporation authorized
the actions of the hotel.73 There was no question that the hotel's
actions were outrageous. Although there is no mention of the
race of any of the parties, I wonder if the group was black. The
image that comes to mind is the Ebony Fashion Fair and the
group sounds like a local black fraternity or sorority that
commonly sponsors these events. Occasionally, I share this
image with the class.74
The image is not essential to the discussion of actual or
apparent authority in the case. The race of the parties would not
have been relevant to a determination of actual authority. If the
hotel managers were white, why would their race make it more
likely than not that Hilton Hotels authorized their actions? If
the plaintiffs were black, why would their race make it more
likely than not that they were reasonable in their belief that
Hilton Hotels authorized their actions? The race of the parties is
not relevant to the extent that the race of the defendant
influenced the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' belief that Hilton
Hotels had authorized their conduct.
However, race may have been exceedingly relevant to the
wrongfulness of the manager's conduct.7" I sometimes ask the
class to think about the underlying circumstances and whether
the event sounds familiar, whether they consider it normal for a
hotel to call the State Police to deal with a banquet. Why would
the manager have insisted on an additional rental? What made
the manager request the rental and why did he go to such
extraordinary lengths to exact it? Does race provide a rational
explanation to all of the above? If race is the explanation why is
this case brought as a tort case for extortion and false
71 Id. at 197 (reciting the actions taken by the defendants).
72 Id. at 197 (memorializing that "the director [of the hotel] and other Hilton
personnel ... summon[ed] the state police, and threaten[ed] to have plaintiffs arrested.").
73 Id. at 197 (summarizing procedural posture and resulting relevant legal issue).
74 I contacted Thomas J. Neuberger, the plaintiffs lawyer, but he did not remember
the case.
75 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1976) (holding that actions were
maintainable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for refusals to contract based on race); see also
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-73 (1989) (limiting decision from
Runyon by holding that § 1981 did not apply to post formation conduct of the contracting
parties).
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imprisonment rather than a racial discrimination claim? Are
principals liable for the racial discrimination of their agents that
involve wrongful conduct that is actionable without regard to
race?7 6 When I ask these questions, I do so because the potential
presence of race in the transaction occurs to me and I believe that
I have something to teach students. A part of what I have to
teach is the benefit of my insights.
The 6th Edition of KLEIN, RAMSEYER AND BAINBRIDGE
continues to include Arguello v. Conoco, Inc.,77 a case that
explicitly involves race. It presents agency questions in the
context of the subordination/dominance axis. Hispanic and
African-American customers had been subjected to racially
motivated refusals to sell them gasoline and harassment at
Conoco-owned and independent Conoco dealers in Texas;
therefore such customers sued for violations of federal civil rights
laws.78 At issue was whether Conoco could be held vicariously
liable for acts of racial discrimination committed by its own
employees and those of its franchisees. 79 The Court determined
that Conoco could be held liable for the actions of employees at
the Conoco-owned stations but not the actions of employees of the
independent stores.80 While it is possible to discuss the agency
liability of a franchisor corporation for the tortuous acts of its
franchisees in Billops without ever mentioning race, it is not
possible in Arguello.1 In order to recover, the plaintiffs needed to
establish that the franchisees were agents of Conoco - the key
legal issue related to the degree of Conoco's control8 2 The
plaintiffs argued that Conoco, Inc. had sufficient control over the
franchisees because the franchise agreements required the
franchisees to maintain their businesses according to the
76 See infra, notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
77 KLEIN, RAMSEYER & BAINBRIDGE, supra note 68 at 70 (discussing Arguello v.
Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2000)).
78 See id. at 805; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2007); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2007).
79 Arguello, 207 F.3d at 806.
80 Id. at 808 (stating "[t]herefore, we find that there is no agency relationship
between Conoco, Inc. and the branded stores in question, and that Conoco, Inc. as a
matter of law cannot be held liable for the unfortunate incidents which happened to Ivory,
Pickett, Ross, and the Escobedos at the Conoco branded stores."). But see generally U.S. v.
Kemble, 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1952) (applying standards for imposing criminal liability on
corporate principal instead of union for statutory violations by union officials).





Conoco's standards governing customer service and that Conoco,
Inc. had the power to terminate franchisees that did not adhere
to those standards.8 3 With respect to the Conoco-owned stores,
the issue was whether the discrimination was within the scope of
employment of the discriminating employees for the purpose of
holding Conoco vicariously liable under the doctrine of
84respondeat superior.
The class can engage in a general discussion of the role of large
corporations in regulating acts of racial discrimination in its
activities or the discussion may be limited to intersection of
agency law and antidiscrimination statutes. Students are less
comfortable with the more open-ended general discussion, but
students tend to be more comfortable discussing those issues in
examining the policies underlying a normative discussion of rules
that should govern the imposition of liability on a large
corporation for acts of discrimination in the bowels of its
activities. The different lines of analyses and results in the
distinction between independent contractors and employees
provide ample meat for the discussion. Perhaps, the general
discussion requires students to state their personal values and
preferences whereas the rule and policy discussion requires
students to speculate about the policy preferences of others.
That is not to say that students are entirely comfortable, but
there may be a sense that they reveal less of themselves.
KLEIN, RAMSEYER AND BAINBRIDGE also includes Ramos v.
Estrada,5 a case that involves Latino and Latina business
people, 6  which serves larger Hispanic communities.
Interestingly, I do not take extra efforts to elevate race other
than to use the story of the case. The authors make no mention
of the nature of the business in the Teacher's Manual. S7 I tend to
follow suit and stay focused on the legal issues concerning the
83 Id.
84 Id. at 810-13. The statute in question was the Civil Rights Act of 1866 codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
85 See KLEIN, RAMSEYER AND BAINBRIDGE, supra note 68, at 623; see also Ramos v.
Estrada, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833 (Ct. App. 1992).
86 See Ramos, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 834. The appearance is derived from the Hispanic
surnames and the nature of the business as a Spanish language television in California.
Id.
87 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 396 (6th ed. Teacher's Manual
2006).
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enforceability of vote pooling agreements. I could also use it as
an example of race in the community context that is the subject
of the section below.
B. Race in the Community Context
The most common examples of race in the context of
community that I use are those involving minority business
enterprises.8 8 They are a convenient construct for examining the
nature of the legal persona of business enterprises. Until the
advent of minority business enterprise programs, business
enterprises neither factually nor legally possessed a color or
race.8 9  The statutes or regulations establishing minority
businesses set aside programs necessarily ascribing a race to
them based on the racial identity of the owners of the business
entity.90  Because of the substantial potential for front
companies, 91 most programs add control and active participation
88 A minority business enterprise is customarily defined as a business organization in
which one or members of a minority group own and control at least fifty-one percent of the
enterprise. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1002 (2008). For a history of minority business enterprise
programs, see Robert E. Suggs, Symposium: Economic Justice in America's Cities: Visions
and Revisions of a Movement: Bringing Small Business Development to Urban
Neighborhoods, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487 (1995), and see also Robert E. Suggs,
Rethinking Minority Business Strategies, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 101 (1990). The
terminology has changed to small disadvantaged business enterprise. 13 C.F.R. §
124.1002 (2008). A business firm qualifies as a disadvantaged enterprise if it "is
unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals..." 13 C.F.R. § 124.101 (2007). Individuals are socially
disadvantaged if they are among those "who have been subjected to racial or ethnic
prejudice or cultural bias within American society because of their identities as members
of groups and without regard to their individual qualities." 13 C.F.R. §124.103 (2008). The
regulations designate several racial groups that are presumed to suffer from social
disadvantage.
89 When I first introduced the minority business enterprise in my business
associations' class, I could comfortably state that prior to the establishment of minority
business enterprises, corporations or business entities did not lawfully possess a race or
color. Consequently, the drafters of minority business programs found it necessary to
create one and succeeded at ascribing or imputing to the entity the race or color of a
majority of its owners. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2023 (2006) (arguing that courts in recent cases have been willing to hold that business
entities possess racial identities and citing Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun
Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004); Bains LLC v. Arco Prod. Co., 405
F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005); Pourier v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue, 658 N.W.2d 395, 404, affd
in part, rev'd in part, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1064 (2004)).
90 But see Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (holding that an
African-American sole shareholder lacked standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for
discriminatory refusal to contract with his corporation).
91 A front company is one whose qualifying owners hold nominal interests as fronts
for the real owners who are not members of disadvantaged minority groups. See Neal
Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme
Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 702 (1996).
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requirements.92 When allocating control in small businesses
these requirements serve as fodder for planning examples.93 I can
explore doctrinal issues in partnership and corporate law
concerning the governance of the enterprise. For example,
students may be asked whether an enterprise organized as a
general partnership will qualify as a minority business
enterprise where the minority partner owns a 51% interest or
whether modifications to the partnership agreement are
required.94 Students may also examine the mechanisms that
capital investors seek in governing documents to protect their
investments and how the MBE requirements clash with those
objectives. The question could just as easily be asked with other
business organizations such as corporations and limited liability
companies.
Some students may wish to discuss the constitutionality of the
programs, but I defer that to another class. Prolonged
discussions of constitutionality in a business law class would
allow the class to veer away from the analysis of the substantive
principle of the course's subject matter. Other students may
inquire about the possibility of front companies and the process
for challenging minority business enterprise status. I keep the
discourse focused on the economic, business, planning, and
technical issues of business associations law. I particularly like
to examine the economic assumptions involved in the standard
definition. 95 The original definition in the Small Business
Administration (SBA) 8(a) program was based on the race of its
owners and the racial composition of the community where its
92 See 13 C.F.R. § 124.1002 (2008) (imposing requirements of management and
control by one or more socially or economically disadvantaged individuals in a small
disadvantaged business (SDB)).
93 For example, the Small Business Administration [hereinafter SBA] 8(a) Program
requires that disadvantaged individuals not merely own a majority in interest, but must
also have the right to control and actively exercise control over business policy and day-to-
day operations. These requirements conflict with the normal protection devices that
investors or lenders would negotiate and obtain. It is not unusual that obtaining such
protection results in adverse consequences for the investor, as in the case of Cargill. in A.
Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). A creditor may
obtain the right to be consulted on major business decisions, the right to monitor business
operations as well as the right to intervene in management upon the occurrence of some
triggering event.
94 I also use examples involving women-owned business enterprises.
95 Since the definition precludes a non-minority capital contributor from obtaining
investor protections in the form of control rights, I argue that the rules frequently attract
non-minority who view their capital inputs as costs of doing business rather than
investments.
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facilities were located or it conducted business.96 While the
original definition sought to foster the direct transfer of capital to
communities through individuals serving those communities the
standard definition is designed to steer capital to disadvantaged
individuals. My goal of encouraging students to see corporate
law issues in communities of color and with persons of color
engaged in wealth seeking has been served. I use the minority
business enterprise materials primarily because I have a deep
interest in the subject.
Furthermore, the SBA section 8(a) regulations also permit the
examination of business development in Indian Country. 97 The
regulations distinguish between businesses owned by Native
American individuals and those owned by tribal governments.
98
Individuals may qualify for eligibility by establishing socio-
economic disadvantage, but tribal governments are presumed to
fall in that category. I prefer to cover doing business in Indian
country in my Business Planning course rather than Business
Associations.
In my Business Planning class, I present a problem based upon
the settlement of the late John Sengstacke's estate. Mr.
Sengstacke, an African American, owned Sengstacke
Enterprises, Inc., a company founded by his family that operated
a chain of newspapers serving African-American communities in
the Midwest. 99 When he died owning more than 70% of the
shares, he instructed the trustee to maximize the value of his
estate for his heirs.100 He also provided for the removal of the
trustee by his heirs in order to keep the business in family hands.
If it remained in family hands, it would continue to be owned by
Blacks. His principal asset was his shares of the newspaper
96 The initial SBA section 8(a) program did not use ownership exclusively to define
those businesses which were eligible. It directed capital infusions in the form of public
contracts to minority businesses which were located in areas with large numbers of
unemployed or underemployed individuals. See Donald P. Young, The "Greening" of the
Small Business Set-Aside Program: The Past, the Present, and Some Thoughts for the
Future, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 883, 884 (1983).
97 For a discussion of the meaning of Indian Country, see Paul W. Shagen, Comment,
Indian Country: The Dependent Indian Community Concept and Tribal/Tribal Member
Immunity from State Taxation, 27 N.M. L. REV. 421 (1997).
98 See 13 C.F.R. §§ 109-11 (2008).
99 See Making an Impact in Real Time, Leading Edge Alliance, Spring 2003, available
at http://www.leadingedgealliance.com/issues-old/2003/spring/realtimes. Sengstacke
Enterprises, Inc. owned four newspapers: Chicago Defender, Michigan Chronicle in




company. Several of the newspapers were profitable and sought
by major newspaper companies. The communities served by the
papers and some of the Sengstacke heirs believed that the chain
should remain under Black ownership. The estate was facing a
significant federal estate tax bill.10' I use the class as a law firm
to represent the trustee for John Sengstacke's trust, his
granddaughter and any of the other heirs. The class assignment
is extraordinary because it forces students to grapple with the
arcane principles of business and estate planning, exposes them
to a sophisticated business transaction with African-American
parties and the vagaries of the subordination/dominance axis.
Students generate a list of questions and research them out of
class and report back. These include the legality of an auction
limited to African-American offerees, the federal estate tax
liability, the fiduciary duties of Northern Illinois Trust, and the
granddaughter if she ousts Northern Illinois as trustee. The class
discussion includes the issue of black community ownership and
the conflict with shareholder wealth maximization obligations of
the granddaughter if she acquires control of the corporation. 102
C. Racial Subordination/Dominance Axis in Doctrinal Law
Some professors directly combine critical race theory and
business law. By doing so, the subordination/dominance themes
are invoked in the context of corporate and commercial
transactions.10 3 Use of the subordination/dominance axis in this
manner is consistent with my race in ordinary course approach.
The critical race approach is more blues in tone while my race in
ordinary course is broader. The former approach is
demonstrated in the Symposium on The Intersection of Race,
Corporate Law and Economic Development: at St. John's
University School of Law.'0 4 For example, in A Trip Through the
101 See id. "By the time we bought the company it was truly a money-losing operation.
It has so many problems - with printers, trade creditors, the IRS - that it could have been
in bankruptcy." Id.
102 After several years, the granddaughter finally found a buyer from within the
family. See id.
103 See generally EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN AND ANGELA P. HARRIS, WHEN MARKETS
FAIL: RACE AND ECONOMICS (Foundation Press 2006).
104 See Symposium, The Intersection of Race, Corporate Law, and Economic
Development, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 697 (2003); see generally Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting
to Discuss Race in Business and Corporate Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 901 (2003).
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Maze of "Corporate Democracy": Shareholder Voice and
Management Composition,0 5 and A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate
Corruption?10 6, Thomas Joo and Steven Ramirez respectively
explore the lack of racial diversity in the boardrooms of large
publicly held corporations. In The Duty to Monitor: Emerging
Obligations of Outside Lawyers and Auditors to Detect and
Report Corporate Wrongdoing beyond the Federal Securities
Laws,10 7 Larry Cata Baca explores the application of the
Sarbanes Oxley Act to the monitoring and reporting of
discrimination within a company.
In Falling Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Firms,'
08
Leonard Baynes shifts his analysis to doctrinal issues. He
explores the application of partnership law rules to address
racial discrimination between prospective partners.109  He
examines the use of partnership law rules as a source of a cause
of action to tackle racial discriminatory employment and
partnership decisions in law firms." ° Partnership law rules
continue to be important, and racial discrimination merely
provides a context for their analysis. In contrast to Judge
Posner's position,"' Professor Baynes examines the use of the
agency and partnership doctrines of good faith and fiduciary
duties to evaluate discriminatory refusals to promote associates
who are racial minorities to partner.112  The
subordination/dominance theme must be discussed as the class
must consider whether the partnership decision was racially
discriminatory. That discussion invariably leads to Mungin v.
105 See generally Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy"
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 St. JOHN'S L. REV. 735 (2003).
106 See generally Steven A. Ramirez, Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate
Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837 (2003).
107 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 919 (2003).
108 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 785 (2003).
109 See id.
110 See generally Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). The decision of a law
firm to admit or not to admit an associate to partnership involves a term or condition of
employment governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq
(2008). After this case, some corporate law professors may have mentioned the application
of antidiscrimination law statutes to decisions on the admission of a partner to a
professional partnership.
111 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
112 See Leonard M. Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Law
Firms, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 785, 830-31 (2003).
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Katten Muchin & Zavis,1 1 3 a case that is the subject of THE GOOD
BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA, 11 4 in which the
appellate court reversed a jury finding of discrimination on the
grounds that no reasonable jury could have found discrimination
on the evidence presented. u1 1  It also invites discussion of David
Wilkins excellent analysis of partnership hiring decisions and
racial discrimination.1 ' 6 Ultimately, however, the class must
return to the fiduciary duties of partners and the decision in
Meinhard v. Salmon.1
17
The Baynes approach takes fundamental issue with Judge
Posner's view that the subordination/dominance axis should be
confined to antidiscrimination law."1 Many students may find
the discussion of this important question uncomfortable, but that
discomfort may be alleviated by the participation of students
interested in or merely curious about law and economics.
However, the issue is one that is highly appropriate for the
corporate law doctrinal course. It would not be appropriate to
segregate the discussion of this question in a class on
employment discrimination. The discussion of whether standard
corporate law doctrines may be used to address racial
discrimination would not be complete without an actual
examination of the application of those rules to the
discrimination setting. Professor Baynes offers that analysis as
delineated above.
David Brennen follows a similar approach in Race-Conscious
Affirmative Action by Tax-Exempt 501(c)(3) Corporations After
Grutter and Gratz.1 9 He examines whether programs and
initiatives to address racial inequities in society by nonprofit
113 941 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1996), rev'd, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
114 PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (Dutton
1999).
115 See id. at 271 (holding in 2-1 vote that jury consisted of eight unreasonable people
under reasonable person standard as not "even a scintillia of evidence" existed to prove
bias).
116 Wilkins found that the structure of law firms' partnership admissions tended to
place African-American attorneys at a disadvantage. See generally David B. Wilkins, On
Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999) (reviewing BARRETT, supra note
114).
117 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
118 See Baynes, supra note 112, at 786-87 (arguing that civil rights statutes are
interpreted on the basis of perpetrator ideology and advocating for the use of contract law
principles of good faith and fair dealing to regulate discrimination).
119 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 711 (2003).
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entities will jeopardize their tax exempt status under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 120 The racial issue is a
tax law issue that lawyers representing nonprofits may be
expected to encounter after Bob Jones University v. United
States. 121 Both scholars consciously interject racial discrimination
into corporate and tax law setting. 122 Indeed the symposium
invited scholars to do so.123
In Attempting to Discuss Race in Business and Corporate Law
Courses and Seminars,124 Cheryl Wade writes of her attempt to
examine issues of discrimination in the corporate context in
teaching business law courses.' 25 Race in this approach means
racial discrimination; the corporate setting again merely provides
a context in which it is examined. Her approach is to directly
raise the subordination/dominance axis in teaching the federal
regulation of proxy solicitations. She does so in her Corporations
course as a part of teaching corporate social responsibility.
126
Professor Wade sees addressing racial inequities in society as a
legitimate inquiry in examining corporate governance because
corporations that fail to monitor discrimination face significant
legal liability that adversely affects shareholder wealth. 127 She
introduces the redress of racial discrimination by corporations
gradually in corporate social responsibility issues before bringing
it to the foreground in discussing the handling of discrimination
class actions by the management of publicly held corporations
and what information they disclose or are required to disclose in
120 See id. at 712 (explaining the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions dealing
with the use of race by public universities and the loss of tax-exempt status).
121 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see David A. Brennen, Race-Conscious Affirmative Action by
Tax-Exempt 501(c)(3) Corporations After Grutter and Gratz, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 711,
727 (2003) (stating that the Court in Bob Jones University concluded that discrimination
against African Americans in public education is against public policy, and therefore the
IRS may revoke Bob Jones University's § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status).
122 See generally Baynes, supra note 112 (highlighting the inequalities of minority
associates and partners in law firms); see also Brennen, supra note 121 (exploring
whether or not race-conscious affirmative action is prohibited by public policy).
123 See generally Baynes, supra note 112; see also Brennen, supra note 121.
124 See Wade, supra note 104.
125 See id. at 906-08 (advocating for the discussion of race in business and corporate
law courses).
126 See id. at 901-02. The legal obligations of directors to monitor racial
discrimination is more fully clarified in Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the
Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 389 (2002).
127 See Wade, supra note 104 at 907 (arguing that race discrimination is a corporate
governance issue).
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proxy materials. 128 Her invocation of race is more pronounced in
the context of corporate governance than in her general
motivation to bring more discussion of social justice into the
classroom discussion.
1 29
I have also used the subordination/dominance axis, but I do so
through the injection of one or more cases like Arguello.1 30 In
Business Associations, I have occasionally used Brown v.
Ward,1 31 a case concerning the interaction of Native Americans
and Whites. It involves a proxy fight between Native American
shareholders of a Cook Inlet Region, Inc., an Alaska corporation
designated as a regional corporation under the Alaska Native
American Claims Settlement Act,132 and explicitly raises the
subordination/dominance axis in the context of a proxy fight.133 A
disgruntled shareholder solicited proxies to use in an annual
election of directors. 134 When his first solicitation resulted in
modest success, he sent a successful solicitation directly invoking
the subordination/dominance axis. 135  Because the company
128 See id. at 910-16 (pointing out that that the SEC does not require the disclosure of
civil rights expenditures).
129 See id. at 906-07.
130 See Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803 (2000) (holding that because no agency
relationship existed between corporation and franchisee, the corporation was not liable for
minority consumers' claims of discriminatory behavior by franchisee).
131 593 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979).
132 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (2007).
133 See Brown, 593 P.2d at 248 (discussing minority shareholder's proxy materials
which contained racially charged statements against corporation).
134 Id. at 250-51 (finding that defendant shareholder's second proxy solicitation
contained materially misleading statements in violation of Alaskan law).
135 The second proxy solicitation contained a satirical cartoon with the following
message:
Hey! We want our money NOW.
We own Cook Inlet Region Inc. not the leaders and Lawyers.
If we each want a big chunk of Land then let's give it to ourselves "NOW' not
20 years from Now. We the stockholders own the Land not the leaders and
Lawyers.
It has been estimated that just the coal reserves owned by us is worth over 2
Billion Dollars. I say "so what" how does that help us. If we were to go ahead
and sell just the coal for its estimated value that would be over Three hundred
thousand dollars "Look at this number $300,000.00" for every man, woman,
and child owner of Cook Inlet Region Inc.
Our leaders and Lawyers say invest, so what do we the owners of Cook Inlet
Region Inc. have after 5 years. We have a piece of white man paper that says
we have millions of dollars, yes Millions of dollars of warehouses, Lawyer fees,
several old Hotels, "which you can't even sleep in without lots of money," more
Lawyer fees, a great Big Multi-Million dollar white man office building where
our leaders can spend our money in comfort AND who knows what else our
money is spent on.
I say lets get out of white man business, sell All this stuff and invest the money
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challenged the solicitation on narrower grounds alleging that the
proxy materials were false or misleading based on
representations about value and the availability of assets for
distributions to shareholders, some professors may exclude the
racial appeal as irrelevant. However, students reading the
opinion clearly see it and have opinions.
Elevating the racial appeal is a delicate business because the
solicitation characterizes whites in a bad light. It is possible to
examine race without emphasizing the racial appeal. The
shareholders are native Alaskans while management is
comprised of lawyers and business executives, some of whom are
not native Alaskans and may be white. 136 The case offers the
opportunity to examine such corporations and to explore the
discourse between management and shareholders in this setting.
It is conspicuous that the court quotes the racial appeal in the
proxy solicitation but otherwise ignores it in its discussion of the
legal issues.1 37 The racial appeal is irrelevant to the discussion of
whether the proxy solicitation contained false and misleading
statements about asset valuations and distributions.
The racial subordination/dominance axis can also arise in
antitrust law. Group boycotts of local merchants were a staple in
the arsenal of the Civil Rights Movement. The legendary
Montgomery Bus Boycott 138 clearly used concerted refusals to
deal with the Montgomery Bus Company that could have been
the subject of a challenge under antitrust laws. In fact, NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co.13 9 is usually mentioned in notes on
group boycotts in Antitrust Law casebooks. 4 ° In that case, the
NAACP organized a boycott of local department stores that did
with the people. This would mean THOUSANDS of dollars for each and every
one of us NOW not 20 years from now.
We the stockholders own Cook Inlet Region Inc., and we own all the cash and
all the minerals and all the land NOT THE LEADERS and Lawyers.
Id. at 248-49.
136 See id.
137 Id. at 249-251 (discussing whether or not statements made in the second proxy
solicitation were materially misleading without referring to race).
138 See Kermit L. Hall, "Lies, Lies, Lies": The Origins Of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 391, 396-97 (2004).
139 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
140 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 413 (4th ed. 1999.); see also CHARLES J. GOETZ AND FRED S. MCCHESNEY,
ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 170 (3d ed. 2006).
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not hire blacks and was sued by the white store owners. 14 1
Similarly, the National Organization for Women was sued for its
organization of the Missouri tourist industry when the state
rejected ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.1 42 Neither
of those boycotts was found by courts to be actionable under the
antitrust laws.
1 43
Those are cases in which those opposed to civil rights
attempted to use the antitrust laws against the victims of
discrimination. 44 Civil rights groups can also use the antitrust
laws. I favor using traditional legal rules to tackle racial
injustice 4 5 and I advance this theme in antitrust law. I use
PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID & WOOD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADE REGULATION in part because it contains a problem
requiring the analysis of an antitrust claim to challenge the use
of a uniform credit scoring system by local banks all of which
denied a loan to a black business owner. 146 Problem 6 requires
students to analyze several antitrust issues concerning group
boycotts and refusals to deal, including the conspiracy theory
oriented concept of conscious parallelism. 147 Students get to
explore whether the conventional antitrust principles will
provide a remedy for what appears to be a racially discriminatory
refusal to deal. By the time students tackle the problem, they
will have the learned the rule of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc. in which the Supreme Court held a group boycott to
be per se illegal where it was effectuated with the intent to injure
the business of a competitor by depriving it of access to
customers or suppliers essential for it to compete. 14 They will
141 NAACP, 458 U.S. at 889.
142 Missouri v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
143 See NAACP, 458 U.S. at 934 (stating that the claim was "constitutionally
insufficient to support the judgment that all petitioners are liable for all losses resulting
from the boycott."); see also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d at 1319 (holding that the
"Sherman Act does not cover NOW's boycott activities on the basis of the legislative
history of the Act and of the Supreme Court's consideration of the legislative history.").
144 See NAACP, 458 U.S. at 892; see also Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d at 1302.
145 See generally Mungin v. Katten Muchin and Zavis, 941 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C.
1996), rev'd, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
146 See PITOFSKY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 378 (5th ed.
2003); see also AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 279 (6th ed.
2004) (containing a few notes examining the collaboration of banks on extending loans
and investigating creditworthiness but makes no reference at all to race).
147 See PITOFSKY ET AL, supra note 146, at 348.
148 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
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also have covered Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co. in which the Supreme Court refused to
invalidate the expulsion of a member from a cooperative.149 Thus,
students learn that a group boycott may be illegal if the
boycotters act with some form of injurious intent.150 The problem
calls into question whether racial discrimination reflected in the
redlining 151 implemented through the credit reporting agency is
the type of injurious intent required to maintain an action for a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 152 The banks decidedly
are not competitors of the tavern. The authors contemplate that
the issue of racial discrimination will be discussed but within the
standard antitrust analysis. 
153
One of the more interesting aspects of Problem 6 is the
existence of an agreement among banks to refuse to lend to black
business owners in the redlined area. As the problem is written,
the banks have formed an investigative agency to determine
creditworthiness. When the black tavern owner applied for a
loan, the agency determined that the loan was high risk because
it was located in an area designated as high risk and
recommended the denial of the loan. Its report was circulated to
all member banks so that the business owner was rejected by all
of the banks on that basis. The formation of the joint venture to
conduct credit investigations was a lawful agreement. The
problem raises the issue of whether the banks made independent
decisions to reject the loan or conspired to boycott black owned
businesses. That question opens the door to delve into conspiracy
149 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
150 See Jane W. Meisel, Now or Never. Is There Antitrust Liability for Noncommercial
Boycotts?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1980).
151 See John Hugh Gilmore, Insurance Redlining & The Fair Housing Act: The Lost
Opportunity of Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Companies, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1
(1985) (distinguishing between racial redlining in which lenders refuse to lend to
borrowers based on the racial characteristics of the neighborhood in which they are
located and economic redlining in which a lender refuses to lend to borrowers in areas
that they deem to have high economic risk).
152 See id. at 567. Some scholars have acknowledged that Klor's demonstrates that
non-economic goals may play a role in antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. Ross,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 196 (Foundation Press 1992) (referring to Jeffersonian
notions of equality of opportunity for small business owners).
153 PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID & WOOD, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TRADE REGULATION 48 (5th ed. 2003). In fact, the authors contemplate that a student
may offer the Posnerian view that the antitrust laws should not address racial
discrimination when other statutes have been enacted to expressly prohibit such acts. Id.
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theory with the conscious parallelism doctrine.1 54 The authors
anticipate that the existence of an agreement among the banks in
fact will be the first question to be addressed in the analysis of
the question. 155
Cases involving free agency in professional sports could also be
used because many involve African-American athletes. 156 TRADE
REGULATION is interesting because it contains a separate note on
group boycotts in professional sports but does not mention race.
157 The authors were perhaps comfortable using antitrust
doctrine where its application to the subordination/dominance
axis was readily apparent. While many of the group boycott
cases in professional sports frequently have involved African-
American plaintiffs,15 labor law or baseball's exemption from the
antitrust laws is usually the pivotal issue and the analysis of the
merits of the antitrust claim is often unnecessary and given short
shrift. For example, in Flood v. Kuhn,159 Curt Flood objected to
the reserve system because he likened it to slavery. 160 His 13th
Amendment claim having been dismissed, he was left with
challenging the reserve system as a group boycott under the
antitrust laws; the courts never reached the merits because of
baseball's exemption noted in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
154 See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 681-82 (1962). The
issue of collective action arises frequently in determining the presence of racial
discrimination. Under the doctrine of conscious parallelism, an agreement or conspiracy
may be inferred under some circumstances in which competitors coincidentally engage in
similar conduct.
155 See TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 153, at 42.
156 See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); see also Clarett v. Nat'l Football
League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d
Cir. 1995); Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Mackey v. Nat'l
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). It is easier to raise the racial
subordination/dominance axis in Sports Law. For example, MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET. AL.,
SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (Aspen Publishers 2005)
devotes a chapter to Race and Inequality. Two other leading sports law casebooks, PAUL
C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS (3rd
ed. 2004) and RAYMOND L. YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed.
2007), devote chapters to gender inequality but not race.
157 See PITOFSKY ET AL, supra note 146. at 346-48.
158 See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Grooming Crossovers, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
225, 239-47 (2001) (discussing various lawsuits involving African-American professional
baseball, football, and basketball athletes).
159 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
160 Id. at 289. Flood described the reserve system as making him "a piece of property
to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes". Id.
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Clubs.161 Race may be examined in these cases without invoking
the subordination/dominance axis, but I defer that discussion to
my Sports Law class.
CONCLUSION
The essence of race in ordinary course means accepting the
presence of race in the conventional analysis of legal principles in
doctrinal subject areas in law school classrooms. Moreover, it
means race is not limited to discussion of the
subordination/dominance axis but should not be viewed as an
alternative to critical race theory. I share with students what I
see in the factual background of the settings in which the cases
occur. Any faculty member, regardless of color or race, may
follow a similar approach. A professor necessarily must handle
the subject from a reference point with which the professor is
familiar. Bringing race into the discussion in business law
classes may provide students with tools to engage in higher-level
intellectual discourse outside the classroom.
Professors who are not African American or members of
another minority racial group may elevate race into the
mainstream discussion of doctrinal subject matter. 16 2 Any
professor may adopt this approach provided he or she teaches
from his or her own experience just, as Professor Hazard did and
is sensitive to the potential for a difficult dialogue.
161 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
162 In ordinary course, I would simply have referred to such faculty as White
professors. See generally, Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Making and Breaking Habits:
Teaching and Learning Cultural Context, Self-Awareness and Intercultural
Communication Through Case Supervision in a Client Service Legal Clinic (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author). The manuscript contains examples teaching cross-
cultural literacy in a clinical program with a racially diverse faculty and student body.
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